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THE INVESTMENT BANKERS' CASE: A SURREJOINDER
WM. DWIGHT WHITEYi
PROFESSOR Steffen's "Observations in Rejoinder" contain substantially no
answers on the merits of the case, with which my article was primarily con-
cerned. He refers to my identification of a second revolution in investment
banldng--"after 1937"-merely as an "intriguing thought."'  He omits any
comment on my demarcation of an earlier revolution dating from 1933.2 In-
deed, the key to the differences between us lies perhaps in this disregard on
Professor Steffen's part for the merits, and his preoccupation with supposed
"points of law" which never arose for consideration because the Government
did not prevail on the facts. A point of lav cannot fairly be presented as
the basis for criticism of a trial judge unless the critic first establishes that
the judge's decision was wrong on the facts. This is something that Professor
Steffen has not merely not done; he has not attempted to do it.
Professor Steffen answers the argument that investment banking had under-
gone revolutions in competitive conditions by stating that the Government's
reliance on evidence from an "earlier period" is explained not by its lack of
awareness of these changes but by the comparative absence of evidence from
defendants' files bearing date subsequent to the institution of the pre-com-
plaint investigation. 3 But my point was not that the defendants should pre-
vail because the Government relied mainly on evidence a decade old when
the complaint was filed. Rather it was that they should prevail because what
was in fact disclosed by that evidence refuted the charged of conspiracy. More-
over, Professor Steffen fails to meet the point that, in a realistic, modern
economy, decrees should not be issued on the basis of evidence of events
which occurred practically a generation earlier.
The decision was that there had been no conspiracy-not that there had
been none in 1953 (the decision date) or 1947 (the date of the complaint),
but that there had been none at any time for which the Government chose
to introduce evidence, whether 1945 or 1937 or 1933 or 1915 or 190--to
take the dates which were most significant in the evidence as the Government
presented it.
Lawyers must at time remind themselves that the law exists for the ends
of justice, not of argument. Nevertheless, it is the function of a surrejoinder
tMember of the New York and Federal Bars. This is a reply to the immediately
preceding article by Professor Steffen, The Investment Bankers' Case: Obsersation.s in
Rejoinder, 64 YALE L.. 863 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Steffen, Rejoinder).
1. Steffen Rejoinder, p. 863.
2. The reference xas to the "earlier generations of bankers" and tie "revslutiin
that has occurred in investment banking since that time." Whitney, The Inv'estmn:
Bankers' Case-Including a Reply to Professor Steffen, 64 YALE I-. 319, 339 (1955)
(hereinafter cited as Whitney).
3. Steffen Rejoinder, p. 869.
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to follow arguments in rejoinder, however unrewarding that may seem to
those who prefer reality. Among his "Observations in Rejoinder" Professor
Steffen makes two "points of law," both of which turn on definition of the
conspiracy in the complaint.
"Integrated Over-all Conspiracy'
When Professor Steffen says "Judge Medina committed manifest error,
when he decided the case before him on the assumption that only a single
conglomerate conspiracy had been charged, ' 4 he appears to be saying that a
conspiracy had been proved but that it differed from the conspiracy which
Judge Medina thought had been charged. Thus, Professor Steffen is saying
that Judge Medina decided the case on a point of law, indeed on a pleading
point. This is just not so. He decided the case on the facts and found that
no conspiracy of any kind had been proved. Not merely "manifest error,"
Professor Steffen goes on to say, but "reversible error."5 Can he be seriously
suggesting that a decision, right on the facts, is to be reversed because of an
erroneous dictum as to what section of the Sherman Act the defendants would
have violated if they had been found to have acted in conspiracy?
Professor Steffen particularizes his argument. He suggests that Judge
Medina supposed that only a charge of monopoly, a section 2 charge, was
involved, and not a charge of restraint of trade under section 1. This also
is just not so. Judge Medina and Government counsel devoted most of the
trial to the charge of conspiracy in restraint of trade, the section 1 charge.
The major part of the time was not occupied with defendants' openings, as
Professor Steffen suggests., All of the openings were completed in April
1951, and the time was then exclusively devoted to the presentation of the
Government's evidence until it rested its case in March 1953. It is a strong
indictment for a counsel, himself not present after June 1951, to suggest that
the other counsel for the Government never succeeded, in two years of
presentation of its case, in carrying to the Judge's consciousness the fact that
a conspiracy in restraint of trade as well as a conspiracy to monopolize had
been alleged.
When there is no conspiracy in fact, there can be no conspiracy in law.
And if there be a conspiracy in fact, it is with that conspiracy, and no other,
that the law must deal. If Professor Steffen means to say that law can
punish as conspirators men who have not in fact conspired, then I respect-
fully disagree.
"Terms" and "Means"
Paragraphs 43, 44 and 45 of the complaint alleged many "terms" of which
the conspiracy "consisted," together with many more "means" used to carry
out these "terms." When Professor Steffen's original article implied that
4. Id. at 863.
5. Id. at 864.
6. Id. at 871.
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paragraph 44 set out "means" only,7 and that paragraph 43 set out the "onLy"
conspiracy in restraint of trade in the complaint,8 it compelled me to point
out that:
"paragraph 44... did vot confine itself to 'means ..... the paragraph
was a recital, not of 'means' only for carrying out the conspiracy, but of
the very 'terms' of the conspiracy."' )
Now under the heading "Ternm" and "Means" in his Rejoinder, Professor
Steffen opens by agreeing that paragraph 44 does set out "terms" of the con-
spiracy. But he does so grudgingly, for he qualifies them as "subsidiary" 10
only. He then converts my statement that paragraph 44 "did not confine it-
self to 'means' " and was "a recital not of 'means' only," into a statement
"that paragraph 44 was little, if anything, but a recital 'of the very "terms"
of the conspiracy.' "I' Having made that distortion, he charges me with "dis-
tortion,"' 2 and then warms to the task as follows:
"He [Whitney] then informs the reader-as he did the court-that
everything following [the introductory clause of 44] is therefore really
only a statement of 'terms.' In his view, it seems there were no 'means'
alleged in the complaint."' 3
I am puzzled why Professor Steffen has found it worthwhile to misquote
me, unless it be that he feels a compelling need to cover his retreat. Retreat
it is, for paragraph 44 is now admitted to have alleged "terms" of the "con-
spiracy," from which it follows that Judge Medina was right in examining
them in order to determine whether the conspiracy existed in fact. The
Government's failure to prove the terms of the conspiracy alleged in para-
graph 44 gains added significance from the fact that Professor Steffen con-
ceded in his main article that "most of the [Government's] evidence in the
case bore" on the allegations in paragraph 44 and that that was the "main
thrust of the conspiracy" and "the core of the Government's case."'1
Professor Steffen goes on to admit that "the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing agreement upon the 'terms' of a conspiracy.'" But, caught at
7. Steffen, The Investment Bankers' Case: Some Obse)vations, 64 YAI. L.j. 169,
172-73 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Steffen) :
"In Paragraph 44A, some of the 'means' are stated by which the defendants
are alleged to have agreed 'not to compete among thensevd in carrying out the
conspiracy charged in Paragraph 43 .... In Paragraph 44B, the 'means' are
stated by which the defendants are alleged to have agreed 'to eliminate the com-
petition of other imvestment, bankers' in carrying out the conspiracy."
See also id. at 181 regarding 44E(1), and id. at 182.
8. Id.'at 172 (emphasis in original).
9. WJzitney, p. 325 (emphasis added).
10. Steff en Rejoinder, p. 865. See also id. at 866-67 ns. 22-24.
11. Id.at 865.
12. Ibid.
13. Id. at 866.
14. Steffen, pp. 173, 174, 177.
15. Steffen Rejoinder, p. 8 65 (emphasis added).
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this point, he doubles back and revokes the admission, saying once more that
paragraph 43 alleges the "only" conspiracy in restraint of trade alleged in the
complaint:
"defendants through their various activities [what he had just called
their "various practices or 'means' "] were engaged in a common plat or
scheme to eliminate price-competition between themselves, and to chan-
nelize distribution. That was the conspiracy in restraint of trade, and
the only such conspiracy charged in the complaint."' 0
Professor Steffen has now come full circle, and returned to the proposition
with which he started in his original article: that it was sufficient for the
Government to prove only the allegations of paragraph 43 that the defendants
conspired to restrain and monopolize "distribution, the purchase and sale of
securities [a conspiracy unlawful] in two respects: (1) securities have been
made to flow in controlled channels; (2) prices have been fixed and main-
tained."'1 7 "That," he said, "is the conspiracy in restraint of trade-and the
only such conspiracy-charged in the complaint."' 8
At the trial Professor Steffen was alone among Government counsel in
taking this stand. He was present for only three months in a trial that lasted
nearly three years. What became abundantly apparent, at least to other Gov-
ernment counsel, was that, unless the Government could establish conspiracy
under the allegations of paragraph 44 ("triple concept" and all the rest of it),
they could not establish conspiracy under 43. This must indeed have been
logically apparent to Professor Steffen when he drafted the complaint, for
the extensive allegations of 44 and 45 were then presumably deemed essential
to support 43.
There was in effect no independent evidence to support the allegations of
43 except the hundreds of syndicate agreements. And it was sufficiently ob-
vious, both from the internal evidence gained by reading them and from the
testimony of the Government's own principal witness, Mr. Harold L. Stuart-
senior partner of perhaps the largest banking house in the business, and a
non-defendant firm-that no one could infer a conspiracy on the part of the
defendants from a mass of agreements alike only in that they contained the
same essential features which distinguished the industry as a whole and with-
out which a syndicate could not hold together nor the industry exist."'
It is right to say that the case, presented in Professor Steffen's way-
solely on paragraph 43, with the rest treated as superstructure only-would
be nothing less than an attempt to destroy the independent business of invest-
ment banking as such, and to do so in an intellectually dishonest way, through
the pretense of establishing a conspiracy on the part of the seventeen firms
which the prosecution found to have been most successful in the business,
16. Id. at 867-68 (emphasis in original).
17. Steffen, p. 172.
18. Ibid.
19. There is not space here to review the evidence, but see particularly the section
of Judge Medina's opinion entitled "The Syndicate System," United States v. Morgan,
118 F. Supp. 621, 681-701 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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